Audible secret keying for Time-spread-echo based Audio watermarking by Matsumoto Tatsuya & Sonoda Kotaro







Division of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science,
Graduate School of Engineering, Nagasaki University
Nagasaki, Japan,
sonoda-iihmsp15@cis.nagasaki-u.ac.jp
Abstract—This paper deals with the pseudo noise (PN) gener-
ating method for digital audio watermarking using time-spread
echo hiding. In time-spread echo based audio watermarking,
the secret payload is embedded in the form of multiple echoes
spread by a pseudo noise sequence and the pseudo noise sequence
is used as secret key. Generally, the pseudo noise sequence is
required to be uncorrelated with other sequence and therefore
typically generated by an M-sequence generator. In this paper, we
propose a key sequence generating method which generates a key
sequence from an audio signal. By using the new key sequence
generated from an audio signal instead of an M-sequence, the
key information users have to remember is their secret audio
signal but not a complicated random PN key. Therefore, the
availability of digital audio watermarking would be improved.
After introducing the new key generation method, we evaluated
the proposed key sequence. The result shows it can detect a secret
payload similar to use of a conventional M-sequence and does
not deteriorate inaudibility of the embedded watermark.
Index Terms—time-spread echo hiding; audio watermarking;
I. INTRODUCTION
In the secure watermarking process of embedding and detec-
tion, key information which is shared only with limited entity
is required. The time-spread echo based audio watermarking
technique[1] represents the watermarked secret bit information
as added multiple echoes of a host signal and pseudo noise
(PN) is used in the echo generation kernel. The pseudo noise
sequence used is required to share the process of embedding
and detection as the key information. To detect the embedded
secret payload from the stego signal, the time-spread echo
method distinguishes the watermark bit payload from a cor-
relation between the echo components in the cepstrum of the
stego signal and the shared pseudo noise sequence. Increased
the randomness of the pseudo noise sequence increases robust-
ness against disturbances and increases security against a fake
key sequence. Conventionally, therefore, pseudo noise that has
a low correlation with the other in certain period length, e.g.
M-sequence and Gold sequence, being used as key sequences.
However, such pseudo noise is difficult to remember.
In this paper, we use an audio signal as a watermarking
key sequence instead of pseudo random noise sequences. The
audio signal used as the watermarking key is available for two
reasons. Firstly, what users have to remember is only which
audio signal is used as the watermarking key. And secondly,
the key is difficult for pirates to be noticed as the watermarking
key.
In section II, the conventional time-spread echo method is
introduced. The proposed method for generating watermarking
key by using an audio signal is described in section III. Then
we evaluate the message detection property in the case of using
the proposed watermarking key in sections IV and V. Section
VI presents the resulting conclusion.
II. TIME-SPREAD ECHO HIDING
The diagram of the time-spread echo hiding is basically sim-
ilar to the echo hiding[2]; adding echoes started at time delay
τw corresponded with　 a watermark bit, wi, to the segmented
host signal xi(n). The echo adding kernel, kw(n), w ∈ {0, 1},
is defined as following equation (1), and the watermarked stego
signal segment yi(n) is produced by convolution of xi(n) with
kw(n).
kw(n) = δ(n) + βp(n− τw) (1)
In equation (1), δ(n) is Kronecker delta δn,0, β is the gain of
echoes, and p(n) is the echo transfer function. τw is the delay
time where adding echoes started and it is corresponded with
watermark bit w. In the case of conventional echo hiding, the
p(n) is also Kronecker delta δn,0. In the case of the spread-
echo hiding, the p(n) is made of random binary sequence
(Pseudo noise sequence; PN sequence) and a convolution
process with the p(n) works to spread single-echo to multi-
echoes. During the watermark detection process, it takes
advantage of 　 that the cepstrum of observed stego signal
ŷ(n) repesents the echo kernel in lower qefrencies. Its cross-
correlation with p(n) has a peak at certain lag point. By
comparing the lag point with the delay τw, the corresponding
watermark bit w is identified.
III. PN-LIKE KEY GENERATION FROM AUDIBLE SIGNAL
In spread-echo hiding, the process to cross correlate between
the cepstrum of the stego signal ŷ(n) and spread-echoes p(n)
is equivalent to despreading of the echo kernel. Therefore,
p(n) is required have a low correlation with other sequences of
certain lengthes and therefore M-sequence or Gold-sequence
is often used as p(n). However, such pseudo noise is difficult
to remember. In this paper, we use an audio signal as a
watermarking key sequence instead of such pseudo random
noise sequences.
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Fig. 1. Blockdiagram for key generation procedure from secret key audio
signal
The watermarking key sequence we must generate is a key
sequence of length LPN made from an audio signal s(n) of
length Lsig. In this paper, as the simplest case, we generate the
key sequence by the cepstrum. A key sequence p(n) is made
by averaging the cepstrum coefficients of Lfr samples with
a window shifting Lshift samples on an audio signal s(n),
extracting the LPN coefficients from the low quefrency range
and making the standard deviation of them to one.
The cepstrum (power cepstrum) c(τ) is defined by
c(τ) = F−1[logSω] (2)
where Sω is the amplitude spectrum of the time-domain signal
s(n) given by
Sω = |F [s(n)]| (3)
In Fig. 1, the blockdiagram for the proposed key generation
procedure from key audio signal is shown.
We compute totally N = LshiftLsig−Lfr cepstra from an audio
signal s(n) of length Lsig with a frame length Lfr and a
shifting length Lshift. Then our watermarking key sequence










where qth is cut-off delay and the function Norm[·] makes
standard deviation of the sequence to one.
Figure 2 shows an example of the generated key sequence
and the base music signal.
IV. EVALUATION OF GENERATED KEY
A. embeddable bits
The generated key sequences are evaluated in terms of the
embeddable bits. Both the audio signals utilized in generat-
ing the key sequence and the host signals are picked from
SQAM[3] which is provided by EBU. Table I shows the audio
file list for generating the key sequence and table II shows










































































16 bit-PCM stereo. The key audio signals are the 10 second’s
length from 5 seconds of each signals. To generate 1023 key
length sequence from 10 seconds (441000 samples), we set
a frame length Lfr of 4092 samples. The parameters of the
watermarking process are summarized in Table III.
As a result of the evaluation, Figure 3 shows the ratio of the
successfully embedded bits against host signals for the tested
key signals and a conventional PN sequence.
From Fig. 3, all stego signals watermarked by five key
signals are embedded in almost the same ratios compared with
a case of watermarked by a conventional PN sequence.
The results of some tested host signal show the low bit
ratios of successfully embedded in both case of our keys and
the conventional key, because the host signal have many silent
frames or much pre-echoed frames.
B. Detection by fake key signal
In this subsection, we tried to detect the watermark by using
fake key signals. The host signal is #40. After generating stego
signals by using the true key signal, the watermark bits were
detected by using fake key signals. In Fig. 4, bit error rates in
case of using fake key signals are depicted. Counted amount
TABLE III
PARAMETER SETUPS FOR WATERMARKING
Echo gain β 0.006
Length of PN sequence LPN 1023
Delay of Echo τ 1ms(44 points)
2ms(88 points)
Embedding Bit rate 5.38 bps



























































Fig. 3. Bit ratios of successfully embedded
of bits are number of successfully embedded bits in previous
subsection.
Figure 4 shows that the cases using fake key signals results
in higher than 50% BER. Then the proposed key sequence
generated from a music signal is sufficiently secure compared
with a conventional PN sequence.
V. EVALUATION OF TIME-SPREAD ECHO METHOD USING
AUDIBLE SECRET KEY
To evaluate the detection robustness and the sound quality
of the watermarked signal with the key generated from music
signal, we carried out two experiments. In our experiments,
eight host signals from a SQAM database (Track No. 27, 32,
35, 40, 65, 66, 69, and 70) were used. The all host signals had
a 44.1 kHz sampling rate, 16 bit quantization, and monaural.
The key is generated by using the 10 seconds length of SQAM
track No.60. The watermark embedding settings are the same
as before and are shown in Table. III. Their evaluation criteria,
attacking manipulations and host signal sources are based on
Information Hiding Criteria version.3 [4].
Our proposed method is almost same watermarking tech-
nique with original time-spread echo watermarking[1] except
for the introduction of the key sequence generated from music
signal.






































Fig. 4. Bit error rates: Detection by fake keys
A. Robustness against attacks
First test evaluates the robustness against signal manipu-
lation attacks. Watermarked stego signals were manipulated
by attacks listed in Table. IV. Their listed attacks are the
recommended manipurations which the stego files should be
tested about the robustness by Information Hiding Criteria
Committee[4]. The results of the robustness tests are shown
in Fig. 5.
From the results in Fig. 5, while the BERs on detection for
Track No.27 and 66 are high (about 20%), the BERs on almost
other tracks are lower than 10 % against the attacks.
The result shows that the watermarking method introducted
our new music key sequence has the robustness against the
typical manipulations.
B. Objective evaluation of audio quality
The second test evaluates the sound quality of the wa-
termarked stego signals. In our experiment, we conducted
objective tests using PEAQ (the perceptual evaluation of
audio quality)[5]. The PEAQ measures the deterioration of
the signal from another signal and scores the deterioration on
a scale called ODG (objective difference grade), from -4 (Very
annoying) to 0 (Imperceptible) as shown in Table V.
The scored ODG of the stego signals are shown in Table. VI.
The results show that the stego signals are scored higher than
-1.7 and the deterioration was perceptible, but not annoying.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper presented the evaluation of the key generated
from a secret music signal for the well-known time-spread
echo based audio watermarking method. In this paper, the key
sequence is generated by taking the lower quefrency range
in averaged cepstrum of the secret music signal. From our
experiment, the generated key sequence has almost as same
detection performance as the conventional PN sequence. Fur-
thermore, the stego signal watermarked with our key sequence
is robust against many attacks and satisfies inaudibility.
TABLE IV
ATTACK CONDITIONS FOR EVALUATION [4]
attack conditions abbreviation at Fig 5
MP3 compression 128 kbps const. rates mp3o
noise addition S/N = 36dB wgn0
bandpass filtering 100 Hz ～ 6 kHz, -12 dB/oct. bapf
pitch stretching w/o invariant duration (1) +4% tsmp
pitch stretching w/o invariant duration (2) -4% tsmm
time stretching (1) +10% spep
time stretching (2) -10% spem
echo addition 100 ms, -6 dB echo
two times MP3 compression 128kbps const. rates mp3t






























Fig. 5. results of the robustness tests: Bit error rates of stego signals against manipulation attacks
TABLE V
ODG SCORES AND DESCRIPTION IN PEAQ
ODG score description
0 Imperceptible




As furture work, we aim to utilize a personal voice as the
key. A method to generate the key from a voice securely and
conviniently is required.
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